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ABSTRACT 
This paper analyzes the effects of monetary policy and financial variables over 
Portuguese firm-level Unit Labor Costs (ULCs), between 2006 and 2009. It focuses on 
log-decomposing ULCs, as wages, number of employees, value added and price 
deflator, allowing isolating the main contributors for the overall effect. 
 Using merged information from firms annual balance sheet, annual employer-
employee dataset and price indexes datasets (Industrial Price Production Index and 
Consumer Price Index), we have obtained the following results: (i) Value Added stands 
as the highest contributor for the Small firms’ overall effect, on the other hand, for the 
Medium and Large firms case, the overall effect is driven by the Labor Market 
variables; (ii) on a year-by-year analysis, no statistical evidence on dynamic instability 
of the estimated effects; (iii) for the dynamic model, only statistically significant 
contemporaneous effects of the monetary policy and financial variables over Small 
firms’ ULCs. 
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RESUMO 
O presente artigo analisa os efeitos da política monetária e das variáveis 
financeiras sobre os Custos do Trabalho por Unidade Produzida (CTUPs), ao nível das 
empresas Portuguesas, entre 2006 e 2009. Dá-se especial enfoque à decomposição 
logarítmica dos CTUPs, enquanto salários, número de trabalhadores, valor acrescentado 
e deflator de preços, permitindo isolar o principal contribuinte para o efeito global. 
 Usando informação combinada do balanço anual das empresas, informação do 
trabalhador e de índices de preços (Índice de Preços na Produção Industrial e Índice de 
Preços no Consumidor), obtivemos os seguintes resultados: (i) o Valor Acrescentado é o 
principal contribuinte para o efeito global, no caso das Pequenas empresas, por sua vez, 
no caso das Médias e Grandes empresas, as variáveis do Mercado de Trabalho aparecem 
como as principais contribuintes do efeito global; (ii) numa análise anual, não existe 
evidência estatística a favor da instabilidade dos efeitos estimados; (iii) para o caso do 
modelo dinâmico, apenas efeitos contemporâneos estatisticamente significativos da 
política monetária e das variáveis financeiras, sobre os CTUPs das Pequenas empresas. 
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Discussions about the ways of improving competitiveness within the European 
countries are currently the main concern of political authorities, to promote economic 
growth and to reduce financial markets’ pressure over sovereign debt, especially after 
the Euro adoption. Such debate fall in the discussion of country-level Unit Labor Costs 
– hereinafter ULC(s) –, total labor compensation to labor productivity, i.e. total labor 
cost per unit of output, interpreted as a measure of competitiveness. 
Countries can adjust their ULC by promoting overall labor productivity 
(measured as real value added to workers), but also by reducing the total cost of labor, 
which can be quite oppressive, for the workers side. Besides, the adjustment through 
capital can also affect competiveness. The question is: which one grows faster, i.e. does 
the nominal wage grows faster than the labor productivity or, on the other hand, does 
nominal profit rate decreases slower than capital productivity? 
Since the ULC can be interpreted as a synthetic index of competitiveness, it 
hides several specific characteristics as nominal rigidities (prices and wages), but also 
quantity rigidities (labor), both likely to constrain the monetary transmission 
mechanism. Consequently, it emerges as a rigid competitiveness index. Therefore, 
decomposing the ULC allows isolating specific dynamics and should minimize 
combined rigidities effects. 
In addition, several studies, using country-level data, suggest towards the firm-
level analysis for a deeper and thorough investigation, in order to understand how 
misleading the aggregate analysis can be. 






This study focuses on the analysis of annual Portuguese firm-level data, 
contributing to the state of art with an extensive investigation about how Portuguese 
firms’ ULCs react to the monetary policy and to other financial variables, evaluating 
how effective the monetary transmission mechanism is, in terms of competitiveness.  
We aim at combining typically microeconometric analysis with 
macroeconometric frameworks, in terms of the multipliers analysis (average short run 
and average long run effects). 
Taking into account the characteristics of the Portuguese firms, we will 
separately analyze them considering their different size – Small, Medium and Large 
firms –. However, we will implement the same model to explain these “universes”.  
Marques et al. (2010) and Druant et al. (2009) show us that the Small firms are 
likely to be less rigid, relatively to the Large ones, and also slower in adjustments to 
monetary shocks, so we might expect that the Small firms’ ULCs might display a 
lengthened response and, therefore, less constraints for the monetary transmission. 
The remainder of this paper is organized as it follows: section 2 provides a 
review of relevant literature, while section 3 describes data and their refinements. 
Sections 4 and 5 present empirical methodologies and the results, respectively, while 
section 6 presents the robustness checks performed. Finally, section 7 concludes. 
2. LITERATURE REVIEW 
Felipe and Kumar (2011) analyze the evolution of ULCs for several OECD 
countries, as well as their relationship with income distribution and firm-level ULCs. 






Algebraically, the economy’s ULC, in period t , can be described as it follows: 
 w L LaborCompensationULC p p LaborShare p
VA VA
×
= × = × = ×   (1) 
by log-linearizing equation (1), we get: 
 ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )log log log log logULC w L VA p= + − +  (2) 
where w  is the total labor compensation per worker (or just wages, even though it 
includes additional compensations to workers), L  is the number of employees, VA  is 
the value added and p  is the price deflator (a unitless magnitude). By log-linearizing, 
we can isolate the driver(s) of a specific effect, over the ULC. 
Especially for Portugal, it is argued that the progressive loss of competitiveness 
is essentially due to the price deflator growth. It might be true in aggregate level, but it 
does not necessarily hold for the firm level case, since the aggregate ULC does not 
result from a simple weighted average of each firms’ ULCs. However, we can rewrite 
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where iϕ  is the share of the thi  firm’s value added, in total value added, and iLs  is the 
thi firm’s share of labor on its value added. Recalling equation (1), we can decompose 
the thi  firm’s labor share as: 
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 Combining (1), (3) and (4), the aggregate ULC can be rewritten as it follows: 
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proving the underlined difference. 
Altomonte et al. (2012) also discuss the distortions that might arise from a 
simple aggregate analysis, due to improper weighting, pictured on a misrepresentation 
of a given sector or firms’ cluster (by size, labor force characteristics, and so on…). 
Indeed, the “average” policy effect can hide quite heterogeneous responses for some 
firms, even though “average” competitiveness gains; also one can be inflicting a severe 
cut in a growing sector or firms’ cluster, while encouraging a big saturated sector. 
 Knowing that the aggregate analysis might be distortive, the concept of 
disaggregation must be taken to another level, as the ULC summarizes three variables 
with an extensive literature about their rigidities: prices, wages and employment.  
Marques et al. (2010) assemble micro evidences on commonly observed 
correlations with respect to (hereinafter w.r.t.) price rigidities: (i) in firms with high 
labor cost share, prices seem to change less frequently; (ii) changes in demand and in 
competitors prices mainly matter for price decreases, hence competition seems to reduce 
price stickiness, consistent with recent findings on macroeconometric literature, using 
disaggregated price data, as prices also respond slower to a monetary shock1; (iii) firms 
seem to respond faster to negative, than to positive demand shocks, however their size 
do not determine these adjustments, following Dias et al. (2011) results, from an 
Ordered Probit estimation of price adjustment lags to firms’ characteristics. 
                                                 
1 See Boivin et al. (2009), Bils and Klenow (2004) and Bils, Klenow and Kryvtsov (2003). 






 In terms of wages, they are also to be known as sticky. Druant et al. (2009) 
studied the relationship between prices and wages in European firms and their findings 
are straightforward: commonly, firms adjust wages less frequently than prices. Aiming 
at the Portuguese case, there is a positive correlation between Small firms’ flexibility 
and wage adjustments, contrasting with Large firms, which typically adjust through 
wage supplements, as they also prefer cheaper hires, potentially lowering the quantities 
rigidity, as advocated by Dias et al. (2012) and Centeno and Novo (2012). 
These results are also widely discussed in Branguinsky et al. (2011), focusing on 
the Portuguese Labor Market, with high degree of labor protection and excessive 
government support for smaller firms, making adjustments very problematic and 
shifting firms’ size distribution since the 70’s. By presenting a model assuming high 
degree of labor protection, operating as a tax on wages, they conclude that this may 
cause degradation on allocated resources, potentially lowering aggregate productivity. 
3. DATA DESCRIPTION 
In this section, we present detailed information about all the datasets used, in this 
analysis, and all the refinements made, so that we have representative information about 
our universe, minimizing all possible bias, such as data selection or measurement errors. 
Finally, a brief descriptive analysis for the relevant variables is presented. 
3.1. Merged Datasets 
The present study uses annual merged data from “Central de Balanços (CB)”, 
Portuguese Instituto Nacional de Estatística and Banco de Portugal, “Inquérito 
Empresarial Simplificado (IES)”, Portuguese Instituto Nacional de Estatística and 






Banco de Portugal, and “Quadros de Pessoal (QP)”, Ministry of Labor and Social 
Security, for the 2002-2009 period.  
The CB and IES datasets provide information from firms’ balance sheets, while 
QP provides detailed information about their workers, in terms of quantities, spendings 
and their characteristics (years of schooling, workers experience, gender, and so on…). 
CB is an annual dataset that covers the whole sectors of the Portuguese economy 
since 2000, excluding the Financial Sector, Public Activities2 and Societies. It was 
incorporated in IES, introduced in 2006, with the objective to simplify the annual 
reporting to the public entities, responsible for supervision, investigation and statistical 
information providing. This transition allowed reducing the cost of obtaining 
information and expanding the statistical information to the “universe”, already in 2005, 
due to 1T −  reporting, as a control. At that point, the statistical information was 
obtained from a sample of firms who provided their balance sheets to Portuguese 
Instituto Nacional de Estatística and Banco de Portugal.  
Note that when CB-IES was merged with QP, there was a loss of about one 
million observations, almost a half of the total, at that point. We underline two reasons: 
firms report IES but do not report QP, and vice-versa. No plausible explanations were 
found for such behavior, due to the compulsory nature of both IES and QP. 
In addition, once firms report their 5-digit “Classificação Portuguesa das 
Atividades Económicas (CAE), Revisão 2.1”, for the CB period, and “CAE Rev. 3”, for 
the IES period, we have also merged Industrial Production Price Index (IPPI) and 
                                                 
2 “CAE Rev. 2.1” section J, L, P and Q and “CAE Rev. 3” section K, O, T and U. 






Consumer Price Index (CPI) annualized data, from Portuguese Instituto Nacional de 
Estatística, to deflate Industry and Electricity and Water firms’ ULCs and Construction, 
Trade and Services firms’ ULCs, respectively. This procedure is conditional to the 
different CAE classification revisions reported, avoiding possible measurement errors 
arising from incorrect correspondences between “CAE Rev. 2.1” and “CAE Rev. 3”.  
It is important to note that the existing firms in 2005 and which did not report 
IES-2006, are also taken into account and deflated according to “CAE Rev. 2.1”. Those 
who were still observed in both 2005 and 2006 are deflated according to “CAE Rev. 3”, 
due to 1T −  reporting of CAE, in IES-2006. 
Since IPPI is referred to CAE classification, we have directly merged the 
information for 3-digit “CAE Rev. 2.1” firms, from IPPI base 2000 (from 2000 to 
2008), and 3-digit “CAE Rev. 3” firms, from IPPI base 2005 (from 2005 onwards). 
In contrast, we had to reclassify CPI, referred to 5-digit “Classificação 
Portuguesa do Consumo Individual por Objetivo (CCIO)”, equivalent, at 4-digit level, 
to 3-digit “Statistical Classification of Products by Activity in the European Economic 
Community (CPA)”3. The latter has a direct correspondence with CAE at 3-digit level. 
Like the IPPI, the CPI is separated in two basis year: CPI base 2002 (from 2002 
to 2008) and CPI base 2008 (from 2008 onwards). But merging is not straightforward, 
since, in 2008, the CPI turned to be a chain index, raising some additional difficulties, in 
terms of regrouping the elementary indexes to the new classification4. 
                                                 
3 Correspondence table available at http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/ramon (COICOP 1999 - CPA 2008). 
4 The International Labor Organization provides an extensive guide to CPI methodological issues 
available online at http://www.ilo.org/public/english/bureau/stat/download/cpi/corrections/chapter9.pdf. 






Then, we have merged these two different CPI bases, reclassified in both 3-digit 













= ×  (6) 
so it can be possible to deflate the respective firms, taking into account the different 
classifications reported. 
 Note that these deflators are not firm-level, due to confidential restrictions, 
especially in IPPI. Therefore, unavoidable measurement errors might be a strong 
possibility, due to aggregation and heterogeneity omission, in sectors whose firms’ 
product differentiation is high or moderate. 
Also, both IPPI and (reclassified and retropolated) CPI are at 2006 basic prices, 
once we have gathered information about the (aggregate) Gross Value Added, from 
Portuguese Instituto Nacional de Estatística, so we could compute firms’ weights on the 
aggregate, for representativity purposes. 
In terms of the Monetary Policy variable, we have collected information from 
the European Central Bank’s marginal lending facility reference rate, available at 
Eurostat. The annualized data is obtained by weighting the observed value by the 
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where 1,...,j J=  is the number of changes in the reference rate and jd  is the number of 
days that the reference rate hold until the 1j +  change. 






3.2. Data refinements 
Firms which report turnover and assets above 1000€, strictly positive employees 
expenditures, at least one person employed, strictly positive capital and value added 
(which must be higher than total labor compensation), were included on this analysis. 
However, firms which report ratios above 100%, such as Return on Equity, 
Apparent Cost of Debt (total financial interest expense to financial debt, including bank 
loans, medium and long maturity bonds, and subsidiaries loans) and Bank’s interest rate 
for Short Run and Long Run loans (total financial interest expense to bank loans) were 
excluded, which had a less than 6% impact in the overall observations. 
For comparability issues, between static and dynamic models, we have imposed 
that the firms’ ULCs, apparent cost of debt, bank’s interest rate, turnover and return on 
equity must be observed at least two consecutive times. This restriction cuts 
observations by almost a half, especially due to the non-reporting of financial variables. 
Additionally, one time observation is lost.  
We call the attention to the fact that all of the refinements above do not severely 
affect the empirical distributions for the relevant variables. Nevertheless, the Micro 
firms were excluded due to lack of dynamics and since only the stable ones remain. 
For a unique characterization of the firms’ size, during the analyzed period, we 
apply the following criteria: 
 ( ) ( )1dim 1 dimT iti t aT a − == − + × ∑  (8) 
where T  is the number of non-missing time observations for the thi  firm and a  is the 
first year that we observe the thi  firm, conditional to firms’ ULC observability. In a 






preliminary analysis, we examine, in our dataset, that the probability of transitions 
between different firm sizes is below 6%, and it is typically a reduction in size: Medium 
to Small and Large to Medium. For simplicity, we consider this effect negligible, 
strengthened by unchanged signs and minor changes in magnitudes of the estimated 
coefficients, in preliminary Fixed Effects estimations. 
 We accommodate the sectoral changes, due to misreporting of CAE, before 
2005, or changes on the main activity, by dynamic observability of firms’ ULCs. If a 
given firm spent most of the time in the “old” sector, then the “new” sector observations 
were excluded. If not, then the “old” sector observations were excluded. If a given firm 
spent the same time in both “old” and “new” sectors, then the observations earlier than 
2005 were excluded, since there was a major revision of CAE reporting, when IES was 
introduced. This procedure had a 0.2% effect in overall observations. 
However, a possible selection bias emerges from the CB dataset, towards the 
Large firms, which is straightforwardly observed when we analyze the effect of IES 
introduction: little impact on total number of Large firms and an exponential increasing 
effect, as firms size decreases. 
The solution would be estimating a first step year-by-year Probit, to obtain the 
Inverse Mills Ratios (IMRs), as suggested by Wooldridge (2002), but there are also 
severe constraints to that procedure: we do not know the year that a given firm is “born” 
and we also do not know if the missing value is due to exit, lay-off or non-observability.  
Besides, even if it was possible to identify these dates, the first step year-by-year 
Probit should be estimated using balanced regressors, i.e., we need to observe several 






regressors for the periods wherein firms have already left the panel, which, in this case, 
are the macroeconomic variables. Therefore, even if a panel-style Probit is estimated, 
when constructing the IMR, using this dataset, it would be time-varying, but equal for 
all firms, in a given year, unlike the usual Heckman selection bias correction5. 
Being aware of such additional difficulties, we will only analyze the IES period 
(2005-2009) and, as a robustness check, we will analyze the whole period (2002-2009), 
for the Large firms observed in both periods, as they are not likely to be selected. This 
allows us to control possible changes in the estimated signs and magnitudes. 
3.3. Descriptive statistics 
Based on appendix A, we present an initial descriptive analysis, for the relevant 
variables, in levels, and observe that: (i) as firms size increases, both average ULCs and 
average price deflators tend to be lower, while average wages, average number of 
employees and average value added follow in the opposite line; (ii) heterogeneity 
related to both ULCs, its components and the financial variables, tends to be higher, as 
firms size increases; (iii) no clear pattern for the financial variables’ averages; (iv) 
aggregate apparent cost of debt is always higher than any other aggregate interest rate 
considered, reflecting risk perception, once it covers several other ways of financing. 
4. ECONOMETRIC FRAMEWORK 
This section addresses the econometric methodologies implemented, based on 
Portuguese firm-level ULCs and their decomposition, starting with a static model and 
                                                 
5 See also Heckman (1976). 






respective specifications tests, to a coefficient stability cross-sectional analysis, 
concluding with a dynamic model and respective multipliers analysis. 
4.1. Models’ characterization and the decomposed Unit Labor Costs 
Due to the lack of relevant literature related to the functional form of firm-level 
ULCs and specifically to the relationship between competitiveness and the monetary 
and financial variables, we will use the log-decomposition in (2), analyzing these effects 
in terms of elasticities, allowing highlighting the driver(s) of the overall effect.  
Our purpose is to estimate a system where the dependent variables are the log-
decomposed ULC: logarithm of wages, logarithm of the number of employees, 
logarithm of value added and logarithm of price deflator. Separately we will estimate a 
model with the logarithm of ULC as the dependent variable. For each of these, we 
perform three different estimations including, in each, the logarithm of apparent cost of 
debt (logACD), then the logarithm of bank’s interest rate (logBank) and finally the 
logarithm of marginal lending facility (logMLF), at once. Each model is also estimated 
by each firms’ size.  
Using this alternation strategy, we can isolate a direct monetary policy effect, 
from banks and financial markets influence on the monetary transmission mechanism to 
Portuguese firms, in terms of competitiveness. 
We have also included several controls on these estimations, described in 
appendix B, accounting for the sensitivity of Portuguese firms’ ULCs to capital, labor 
and external markets. 
This can be summarized, in the static version, as it follows: 
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where each of the elements, in itH , are alternately used in each equation, also providing 
different estimates considering the element used, reflecting the “H” on superscript. In 
equation (9) and (10), itX  is a ( )1 1k − ×  vector of control variables. In addition, the 'sβ  
are scalars and 'sδ  are ( )1 1k − ×  vectors, on equation (9) and in each equation of the 
system in (10). The 'sδ  also contain a constant term. 
Sectoral and time dummies have also been included, the latter with the exception 
for the model with the logarithm of marginal lending facility, since it is a 
macroeconomic variable, and so, time-varying, but equal for all firms, in a given year. 
In the dynamic version we have the following: 
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The alternation procedure, concerning itH  elements, still holds on these 
estimations. In this case itK  is a ( )2 1k − ×  vector of control variables and may contain 
lagged regressors. In addition, the 'sα  are scalars, 'sψ  are 2 1×  vectors and 'sζ  are 
( )2 1k − ×  vectors, on equation (12) and in each equation of the system in (13). The 'sζ  
also contain a constant term. Sectoral and time dummies have also been included. The 
lagged regressors, in itR , allows us to obtain the relevant impact multipliers. 
Note that the “sum” of the estimated coefficients for each covariate, obtained 
from the log-decomposed ULC system in (10) and (13), is equal to the estimated 
coefficient for the same covariate, in the logarithm of ULC equation. For example, in 
(10), , , , , ,w H L H VA H p H ULC Hβ β β β β+ − + = . 
Even though we have information about the population, inference might be 
interesting, since this population can be interpreted as resulting from one realization of 
an independent and identically distributed (i.i.d.) process, as in macroeconometrics 
approaches. 
We will focus on Seemingly Unrelated Regression (SUR) method, purposed by 
Zellner6, to estimate the systems of log-decomposed ULC, in (10) and (13). Note that 
each equation, on these systems, has the same set of regressors. 
As shown in Hayashi (2000), by making no assumptions about the inter-equation 
error correlation, having common exogenous regressors in each equation and assuming 
conditional homoscedasticity, the Feasible Generalized Least Squares (FGLS) is 
                                                 
6 See also Zellner (1962, 1963) and Zellner and Huang (1962). 






numerically equivalent to the efficient Generalized Least Squares (GMM) estimator, 
proposed by Hansen (1982). Hence, considering this framework, SUR is numerically 
equivalent to the efficient GMM. Likewise, Amemiya (1985) and Greene (2002) claim 
that SUR with common regressors in each equation is also numerically equivalent to 
equation-by-equation Ordinary Least Squares (OLS)7.  
On the other hand, Avery (1977) and Baltagi (1980) argue that when estimating 
a model with error components, this condition is not sufficient for the equivalence to 
hold, since the composite error is autocorrelated, due to the presence of the individual 
effects. Besides, SUR assumes that the error for each equation is non-autocorrelated, 
however it can be correlated between different equations.  
The latter is the case of the Random Effects (RE) estimator, since the individual 
effects are not eliminated, so the composite error is autocorrelated in each equation. 
Therefore, a Random Effects SUR is not numerically equivalent to equation-by-
equation RE. 
4.2. Static Model 
We begin with a static model using Fixed effects (FE) and Between effects (BE) 
estimators. Baltagi (2005) and Kennedy (2003) argue that typically FE, based on the 
time-series component of the data, tends to provide short run estimates, while BE, based 
on the cross-sectional component of the data, tends to provide long run estimates, since 
it is a regression on individual time-averages, i.e., a cross-sectional regression over 
                                                 
7 These authors provide different demonstrations of this equivalence. See also Lu and Schmidt (2012) for 
all possible equivalences between GLS and OLS estimators.  






time-averages, capturing the structural component of the data. Following this strategy, 
we can isolate the “short run” and “long run” overall effect, as well as their drivers. 
As FE and BE are, in fact, OLS estimations of a transformed model, we extend 
the SUR-OLS equivalence to this case. If we perform FE estimations, the transformed 
error component is not autocorrelated because the individual effects are eliminated with 
the within transformation. As for the BE estimations, the SUR-OLS equivalence 
directly holds since we are performing a cross-sectional regression over time-averages. 
Also, we guarantee that the estimated variances are corrected for possible 
presence of heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation (in the residual structure), using firm-
level cluster robust standard errors (White cluster for FE and cluster bootstrap for BE, 
based on one hundred replications), insuring consistency of inference for both FE and 
BE estimations. 
Note that both FE and BE provide consistent estimates if the individual-specific 
effect ( )iµ  is not correlated with the regressors, i.e., if the Hausman test, based on the 
differences between FE and RE estimates, lead us to the non-rejection of the null of 
exogeneity. However, if the null is rejected, then RE and BE are inconsistent, since both 
contain the individual effects and BE is a special case of RE. Additionally, this test 
implies that the RE estimator is more efficient than the FE estimator. 
However, as argued by Wooldridge (2002), when the homoscedastic hypothesis 
does not hold, for RE estimations, the usual Hausman test have a nonstandard limiting 
distribution, therefore the asymptotic size might significantly differ from the nominal 
size. Also, Hahn et al. (2011) argue that when the within variation is small, the 






asymptotic normality of the FE estimator might be a “doubtful assumption”. As the 
Hausman test is based on the asymptotic normality of both FE and RE (and also BE), if 
these conditions do not hold, this test has, once again, a nonstandard limiting 
distribution. Furthermore, in the presence of small within variation and reduced number 
of observations the central limit theorem is no longer applicable. 
Bearing in mind the issues above, Wooldridge (2002) suggests a similar test, 
inspired on Mundlak (1978) seminal paper, assuming that the time-varying regressors 
might be correlated with iµ , in a restricted way: 
 ( ) ( ) 0| , |i i i i i iE Eµ µ γ= = +H X w w γ  (14) 







= ∑w w .  
The test statistic is a comparison between augmented and non-augmented RE 
estimations of equation (9) and each equation of the system in (10), from which we 
obtain the unrestricted Sum Squared Residuals and the restricted Sum Squared 
Residuals, respectively. Bearing in mind this formulation, the test is valid even if the 
homoscedastic hypothesis does not hold. If this is the case, then a robust Wald statistic 
is reported instead, based on Wooldridge0 :  0H =γ . 
It should be noted that we are not interested in testing the simultaneous 
exogeneity of the regressors included on the whole system, in (10). Instead we want to 
test their exogeneity, in each equation of the system. 
The FE test will be omitted from the outputs, since, in micro-panels, individual 
fixed effects are likely to be statistically significant. 






We stated the weaknesses of BE estimation, as it drops panel structure of the 
data, but also, in micro-panels, it is likely to be inconsistent, due to the correlation 
between the regressors and the individual effects. Therefore, the FE estimates might be 
interpreted not only as a typical “short run” (within) average effect, but also as a 
structural average effect, equaling the short run to the long run “multipliers”, since no 
lagged regressors were included, at this stage. 
Considering this scenario and the purpose of this study, the next step should be 
towards an estimation of a dynamic model, examining the differentials between the 
short run and both lagged and long run effects. 
4.3. Cross-Sectional analysis 
Knowing that the time dummies capture time-specific effects over the dependent 
variable, we can extend this approach to the regressors, by interacting them with these 
dummies, which is equivalent to a cross-sectional OLS regression of equation (9) and 
the system in (10). We will estimate the static system of the log-decomposed ULC, by 
SUR, and the ULC equation, by OLS. This can be summarized as it follows: 
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 (16) 
1,..., ;  2006,..., 2009ji N t= =  and 'siµ  are the individual effects, that might be 
interpreted, in this case, as an unobserved variable. Sectoral dummies have been 
included.  






The consistency of these estimations will depend on the Hausman test results, 
which will be carefully interpreted, bearing in mind its limitations. 
We will implement these SUR and OLS estimations using firm-level cluster 
bootstrapped standard errors, based on one hundred replications, as a cautious strategy, 
suggested by Wooldridge (2002). 
Being interested in the estimation of a dynamic model, we intend to ensure the 
dynamic stability of time-specific effects w.r.t. ULCs and to its subcomponents. Thus, a 
joint test for the coefficients equality, across different years, will be performed, 
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 (17) 
and a similar null hypothesis is used for the remaining equation-specific betas.  
Once again, this test is a comparison between a restricted and an unrestricted 
model, where the first corresponds to the one explained solely by control variables and 
sectoral dummies. A robust Wald statistic is reported, as the standard errors have been 
adjusted. If we reject the null, it is statistically plausible to assume that the estimated 
time-specific effects vary across time, inducing to possible structural breaks. 
4.4. Dynamic Model 
Estimating a dynamic model would be enriching and might have significant 
policy implications, in the sense that it allows analyzing how a specific effect can 
persist over time. 






Bond (2002) provides a guide to dynamic micro-panel data models, such as: 
 , 1 ,  1,..., ;  2,...,it i t ity y u i N t Tφ −= + = =  (18) 
starting with classical estimators, POLS and FE, are widely known to be biased and 
inconsistent for ( )AR p  and ( ),ADL p q  models, with 0p > , especially for low or 
moderate T  case. As, for the POLS case, the lagged dependent variable is positively 
correlated with the error term, while, for the FE case, the lagged transformed dependent 
variable is negatively correlated with the transformed error term, due to the presence of 
individual-specific effects, shown by Nickel (1981). However, having correlations in 
the opposite directions, we know that a consistent estimate would lie between them, or, 
at least, would not be very different.  
Once the problem of estimating dynamic panel data models lies in the presence 
of individual-specific effects, we have to perform a transformation that eliminates this 
source of endogeneity: first differencing8. However, , 1( , ) 0i t itCov y v−∆ ∆ ≠ .  
Thus, a Two Stage Least Squares (2SLS) procedure was then purposed by 
Anderson and Hsiao (1982), using , 2 , 2 or i t i ty y− −∆  as candidates to instrument , 1i ty −∆ . 
Arellano (1989) found that the estimator using , 2i ty −  as an instrument, rather than 
, 2i ty −∆ , have a significantly lower variance. However, 2SLS is not asymptotically 
efficient, as it assumes homoscedastic disturbances.  
                                                 
8 Within, Between and RE transformations do not eliminate this source of endogeneity, as the transformed 
variable is correlated with all the lags of the error term. See also Baltagi (2005). 






Consequently, Arellano and Bond (1991) suggested towards GMM, a suitable 
framework for efficient estimation, especially if the entire set of available instruments 
(in levels) is used, commonly known as the Arellano-Bond (AB-GMM) estimator.  
As we are interested in the estimation of φ , Blundell and Bond (1998) discuss 
the weak performance of AB-GMM, when φ  is near unity.  It is clear that, in this case, 
we have “weak” instruments – the instruments (referred to levels) are weakly correlated 
with the regressors (referred to first differences) –. 
Blundell and Bond (1998) purposes additional moment conditions, based on a 
steady state distribution for the initial condition, 0iy , estimating a system where 
differences are instruments for the levels equation and levels are instruments for the first 
differences equation (Sys-GMM). This strategy was especially helpful in improving 
efficiency, when 1φ  , attenuating the effects of “weak” instruments presence.  
Moreover, if one might be looking to further efficiency, then should proceed to 
compute the optimal GMM weighting matrix. Windmeijer (2005) purposes a variance 
correction for the two-step GMM procedures, as the variance estimator is downwards 
biased, due to the optimal weighting matrix estimation using first-step residuals. This 
correction is especially appropriate for Arellano-Bond and Blundell-Bond type of 
instruments. 
Another topic about these GMM procedures is related to the possibility of 
overfitting biases, as a result from quadratic-in-T  instrument growth, discussed in 
detail by Arellano (2003), ( )O jT N  or ( )O j N  for regressions on endogeneous or 
predetermined variables, respectively, where j  is the instrument count.  






Roodman (2006, 2009) presents two techniques in reducing the instrument 
count: using a subset of lags instead of the entire set, as Wooldridge (2002) also 
suggests, and/or collapsing the blocks of the instrumental matrix9, once the instrument 
growth becomes linear-in-T . 
The main concern about the instrument proliferation is related to the power of 
the over-identifying tests10, especially Hansen, which is robust to the presence of 
heteroscedasticity, but can be weakened by many instruments. Roodman (2009) argues 
that combining both techniques would have significant impact on Hansen tests power, 
not affecting the estimated coefficient, neither the estimated standard errors. 
For unbalanced panels, Roodman (2006, 2009) also suggests using the forward 
orthogonal deviations11 equation, purposed by Arellano and Bover (1995), instead of 
the first differences equation, since the loss of observations is not so severe. 
Bearing in mind all the issues emerging from this GMM setup and ULCs 
appearing to be quite persistent, as a result from preliminary POLS estimations, we will 
run a two-step Sys-GMM estimation for the logarithm of ULC equation, in (12), with 
Windmeijer corrected standard errors, considering the following moment conditions: 
( ) { } { }
( ) { } { }
( ) { },,
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9 Using Holtz-Eakin et al. (1988) and Arellano and Bond (1991) full set of moment conditions. 
10 See also Sargan (1958) and Hansen (1982). 
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where im  contains all regressors (and controls), except the lagged dependent variable. 
As in Windmeijer (2005), im  instruments sub-matrix is collapsed, unlike the 
instrumental sub-matrix including lags and first-differences of the dependent variable. 
As for the system of log-decomposed ULC, in (13), we will use the same 
equation-by-equation strategy. In this case, the model becomes a ( )DL q , with 0q > . 
For POLS and FE estimations, it may be arguable that the lagged logarithm of ULC 
might contain information about the dependent variable and so a source of endogeneity 
still prevails, however, no significant changes were found, using equation-by-equation 
Pooled 2SLS and FE-2SLS. 
Emphasizing again in the logarithm of ULC equation, in (12), we will focus on 
the Hansen test and the statistical significance of the estimated dynamic effects, 
commonly known, in the macroeconometrics literature, as the impact multipliers. 
Taking into account the time dimension of the model, one might think about 
how the expected value of the logarithm of ULC evolves along the years. The 
contemporaneous effect is straightforwardly obtained from the estimation, but obtaining 
the one-step and the long run multipliers requires to rewrite the model as a ( )DL ∞ . 
For the one-step ahead multiplier, ( ), 1log i t itULC H+∂ ∂ , we have: 
( ) ( ) ( )
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now considering a ( )DL ∞ representation: 
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combining (20) and (21) polynomials over itH : 
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equating coefficients of the same power in L , yields: 
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where { }, ,  0,1ULC Hs sθ =  refer to the -steps  multiplier.  
 For the long run multiplier, we evaluate all the variables at the, so called, “steady 
state”, described with asterisks: 
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and the long run multiplier is: 
 















Recalling the one-step multiplier, the null is 1 Step ,0 1: 0
ULC HH θ− = , and for the long 
run multiplier, the null is LRM ,0 : 0
ULC HH λ = . Both are non-linear Wald tests, following a 
chi-square distribution with one degree of freedom (one restriction only). Also, reported 
p-values are based on delta-method approximation. 






In terms of the log-decomposed ULC system, in (13), the one-step and long run 
multipliers are equal, once there is no lagged dependent variable in each equation. Thus, 
the null simplifies to a linear restriction. Focusing on the logarithm of wages equation, 
we have: LRM , , , ,0 1 1 0: 0
w H w H w H w HH λ θ ψ ψ= = + = . Once again, we can highlight the 
statistically significant “driver” for the short and long run overall effects. 
5. EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
In this section the main results will be presented and interpreted, accounting for 
theoretical relationships and the addressed econometric methodologies. The following 
sub-sections are organized as in the previous section: Static Model, Cross-Sectional 
analysis and Dynamic Model. 
5.1. Static Model 
As described before, the FE and BE estimators tend to give us different 
information about the underlying variables: typically we get the time-series and the 
cross-sectional structure of data, respectively, and so “short run” (within) and “long 
run” (between) estimates.  
Note that the model with marginal lending facility will not be considered. Recall 
that this is an individual constant variable and its coefficient would not be identified on 
BE. 
The results from estimation of equation (9) and the system in (10) are displayed 
on table C.1, just for the β  slopes, interpreted as elasticities. In bold we have the 
highest statistically significant contributor to the overall average estimated elasticity. 






In a preliminary analysis, we can observe the statistical and numerical 
importance of the value added on the Small firms’ ULCs. However, for Medium and 
Large firms, this statistical and numerical importance changes towards the Labor 
Market variables. 
On the other hand, price deflator stands typically to be the lowest contributor to 
the overall effect, reflecting a possible aggregation bias due to the non-observability of 
firm-level deflators, as firms’ ULCs are deflated by CAE 3-digit level prices, hiding 
significant heterogeneity for firms with high or moderate product differentiation. 
Focusing on the logarithm of ULC equation, for FE estimations, we underline 
the highest “short run” average elasticity (in absolute value) of apparent cost of debt 
w.r.t. ULCs, for Large firms (0.02%), followed by Medium and Small firms (0.01%), all 
significant at 10%. For the model with the logarithm of bank’s interest rate there are no 
statistically significant effects to account. 
FE estimates corroborate with the literature, since the “short run” (within) 
estimated elasticities have the expected signs, for all equations. Furthermore, Large 
firms are likely to be contemporaneously more elastic to monetary and financial 
variables than Medium or Small firms. However, for BE estimates, this pattern does not 
hold, since the estimated signs and magnitudes are quite dubious, once we denote 
several differences in comparison to, what is meant to be, the consistent estimator. 
Therefore, we perform both classical and Wooldridge’s versions of the Hausman 
test, displayed on table C.1.1. Not surprisingly, we typically reject the null. Since BE is 
a particular case of RE, this result is massive. 






Yet, for Large firms, this test leads us to ambiguous results: in the classic and 
Wooldridge’s version we typically do not reject the null, which is not very plausible, 
compared to the previous results. Also, when analyzing the full sample period for the 
same set of firms (last column), this ambiguity turns out to be even greater, as we 
typically reject the null, for the classic version of this test, contrasting with the 
Wooldridge’s version, where we typically do not reject the null. 
As discussed by Hahn et al. (2011), Hausman specification tests might have a 
nonstandard limiting distribution, in the presence of small within variation (and reduced 
number of observations)12. So, a careful interpretation of the p-values is recommended, 
since the within variation of the included regressors appears to be quite low, for all 
firms’ dimensions, as we can see in the descriptive statistics, from tables A.1 to A.2. 
Considering such problems, we can only rely on FE consistency, which stands 
for both “short run” and structural model, clearly insufficient in terms of the multipliers 
analysis. Additionally, we account for the lack of statistical significance, concerning the 
Large firms estimations, which might be due to the small within variation combined 
with the reduced number of observations, producing very imprecise estimates. 
It is clear, by now, that the drivers of the monetary and financial variables w.r.t. 
firms’ ULCs are not exactly the same, given different firms size. 
5.2. Cross-Sectional analysis 
In this sub-section, we will analyze the results from the estimation of equation 
(15) and the system in (16). Here, our main interest is to scrutinize statistical evidence 
                                                 
12 See sub-section 5.2. 






towards dynamic stability of the monetary and financial estimated effects w.r.t. firms’ 
ULCs. 
Once again the marginal lending facility will not be included, since it is constant 
across firms. Also, for 2006, the coefficients from the logarithm of the price deflator 
equation are not identified, once the dependent variable is evaluated at 2006 basic 
prices, and so, constant for all firms (equal to one). 
Recalling the previous results for the Hausman test, it will imply that SUR is 
inconsistent, due to the presence of a relevant unobserved variable ( )iµ . 
However, the year-by-year results, displayed on tables C.2.1 (for Small and 
Medium firms) and C.2.2 (for Large firms, IES period and full sample period), 
corroborate with the FE results, presented in the previous sub-section. Once again, Hahn 
et al. (2011) findings might help to understand this unlikely coherency. 
In addition, we highlight the statistical and numerical importance of the value 
added, among different years, for Medium firms, which could contrast with the previous 
(static model) results, but a deeper analysis brings our attention to wages as the second 
statistically significant most important contributor to the overall effect.  
Focusing on the implemented test, we typically do not reject the null, described 
in equation (17). Hereupon, these effects seem to be stable among different years. 
Exceptions made to the Small firms’ estimations, where the implemented test 
leads us to the null rejection, in the logarithm of ULC equation, and so the estimated 
elasticities are not expected to be statistically stable among different years.  






A detailed analysis brings or attention to the (non-statistically significant) 
estimated elasticities for the number of employees’ equation, which dramatically 
changes among different years, in both estimations with the apparent cost of debt and 
the bank’s interest rate, severely influencing the overall effect. Even if we interpret this 
result as a possible structural break, due to changes in the monetary stance, the inclusion 
of time dummies in the panel-style estimations would be enough to capture it. 
As for the remaining, once again we account for several statistical significance 
issues, especially for Large firms’ estimations. Also, the price deflator stands as the 
lowest contributor to the overall effect. 
It could be argued that the statistical inference can be contaminated by the lack 
of bootstrap replications, especially for Small firms’ estimations. However, these results 
are robust to changes in the number of bootstrap replications (five hundred, one 
thousand and ten thousand). 
5.3. Dynamic Model 
As stated before, a dynamic analysis would be enriching in sense that one can 
evaluate how a policy effect can prevail over time. Even though the lagged term reflects 
inter-year effect w.r.t. Portuguese firms’ ULCs, it might be quite informative, if there 
are firms that have not adjusted within the same year, which is likely to be the case for 
the Small firms. 
Starting with the estimation of the log-decomposed ULC system in (13), table 
C.3.1 provides results for the model with the logarithm of apparent cost of debt, table 
C.3.2 for the model with the logarithm of bank’s interest rate and table C.3.3 for the 






model with the logarithm of marginal lending facility, by each firms’ size. The 
inconsistency of these estimates might be arguable. However, Pooled 2SLS and FE-
2SLS estimates do significantly differ from these ones13. Also, these results corroborate 
with the FE estimation results, previously presented. 
In terms of ULC persistence, typically the number of employees stands to be the 
highest statistically significant contributor, for both POLS and FE estimations. 
Concretely, for POLS, the number of employees seems to vary in the same proportion, 
on average, to a percentage variation on lagged logarithm of ULC, inducing to a 
possible presence of a unit root, on ULCs.  
Even if we assume this possibility, we cannot test it with 4T = , once panel unit 
root tests assume 6T ≥  for all individual units. Additionally, FE estimations with 
highly persistent variables produce very noisy estimates, compared those from POLS, as 
the within transformation removes (persistent) time effects, almost zeroing out the 
transformed variable, as we can see on tables C.3.1 to C.3.3. 
Concerning the short run effect, the value added stands as the driver for the 
Small firms’ overall effect, in the model with apparent cost of debt, and the driver for 
the Medium firms overall effect, in the model with marginal lending facility. This 
pattern holds in both POLS and FE estimations. However, for Small firms, the 
positively estimated signs do not seem to be coherent with the literature. 
As for the long run effect, this pattern holds just for the POLS estimation of the 
model with the apparent cost of debt, also with (implausible) positive estimated signs. 
                                                 
13 See sub-section 5.4. 






Not surprisingly, for the model with marginal lending facility, the price deflator 
typically arises as the long run driver, in both POLS and FE estimations, for all firms’ 
dimensions, coinciding with price growth controlling policy of ECB. 
Relatively to Labor Market variables, wages emerge, once again, as the second 
statistically most important contributor to both short and long run overall effect, 
especially for Medium firms. 
Recalling the inconsistency of both POLS and FE, if we estimate an ( )AR p  or 
an ( ),ADL p q  model, with 0p > , like the logarithm of ULC equation, in (12), our 
choice will be towards a consistent (and efficient) GMM estimation, already defined as 
(two-step) Sys-GMM. Notwithstanding, we will also estimate equation (12) using 
POLS and FE, interpreted as upper and lower bounds for the consistent estimates, which 
should lie between them or, at least, should not be too far away.  
The major disadvantages, of this GMM procedure, are denoted by its sensitivity 
to moment restrictions14. In the end of appendix C, we discuss the instrumentation 
strategy that provides the most stable estimates. 
Results are presented on tables C.4.1 and C.4.2, where the statistical significance 
is clearly concentrated in Small firms’ estimations. Mainly, Hansen tests do not reject 
the null of correct moment restrictions, after controlling for possible overfitting biases. 
Introducing the autoregressive term in the estimations widens statistical 
significance problems and dominates other effects, as the average estimated persistence 
for the ULCs is above 0.8, for Medium firms, and above 0.9, for Large firms, all 
                                                 
14 See sub-section 5.4. 






significant at 1%. Therefore, it could have been enough estimating an ( )1AR  model, 
instead of an ( )1,1ADL .  
Focusing on Small firms, solely the estimated persistence and short run 
elasticities are statistically significant. Nevertheless the lagged elasticities are also 
statistically significant, both one-step ahead and long run multipliers tests do not lead us 
to the null rejection, so these effects are actually not statistically significant at 10%. 
Since the monetary policy effects are known to not last longer than a year, the non-
statistical significance of the impact multipliers seems to be reasonable. 
Surprisingly, the highest estimated short run elasticity, in absolute value, is 
obtained by the model with the marginal lending facility (0.03%), followed by the 
apparent cost of debt (0.02%) and finally by the bank’s interest rate (0.008%). Both 
signs are consistent with the literature, but the magnitude, especially for the model with 
the marginal lending facility, seems to be unreasonably high, hence this effect might be 
contaminated with time effects, due to the time dummies exclusion, for this model. 
We highlight an interesting pattern, arising from the Sys-GMM estimations: the 
persistence estimates are close to those from POLS, while the elasticities estimates are 
close to those from FE. 
6. ROBUSTNESS CHECKS 
There are several reasons to expect that the results obtained previously, with FE 
estimations for equation (9) and Sys-GMM estimations for equation (12), are sensitive 
to firms’ characteristics like data periodicity (time-aggregation bias), missing values in 
the relevant variables, and/or to functional form misspecification. 






We start our robustness checks, by disaggregating the included firms, to a 
sectoral and size dimension. Using the same alternation strategy, but this time, by each 
sector and firms’ size, we intend to investigate if there is any sector, whose (individual) 
estimated effect significantly differs from the (joint) size-only estimated effect. 
However, due to the lack of observations, only the Small and Medium firms’ models 
were estimated. Besides, there is no significantly different effect to be accounted. 
Considering the descriptive analysis, in section 4, these results were expected, since the 
Large firms stand as the most heterogeneous. 
 Next, we tried to implement an approximate version of the methodological 
criteria, described in section 4, for the sample based quarterly balance sheet dataset, in 
order to investigate if there is any time-aggregation bias on the yearly estimated 
elasticities. However, the number of relevant observations was less than one thousand 
and the Large firms were clearly over-represented. No estimations were performed. 
 Focusing on the missing values in the financial variables, we have engaged on 
an imputation strategy, following three schemes: (i) by CAE (at 3-digit level) average; 
(ii) by year average; (iii) combining (i) and (ii). Surprisingly, following these strategies, 
the results deteriorated, especially in terms of statistical significance. 
Finally, repeating the estimations, considering other functional forms, produced 
no significant improvements over the previous results. 
 Since these alternative procedures suggest that our results are not particularly 
sensitive, we will now turn our attention to the, well known, sensitivity of GMM 
estimates to the moments restrictions chosen. 






We present a proposal, based on non-linear models assumption of Correlated 
Random Effects: if a non-linear dynamic model, augmented by the Chamberlain-
Mundlak device15, produces consistent estimates, then we would expect these good 
properties to hold, in the linear case, when assuming that the time-varying regressors 
and an initial condition, 0iy , (since we are talking about a dynamic model) might be 
correlated with iµ , in a restricted way. Recalling the Wooldridge’s version of the 
Hausman test16, a similar approach was used, however, for a static model. 
Regarding this dynamic approach, we will consider the following model for the 
unobserved heterogeneity: 
 0 0i i i iy aµ γ θ= + + +z γ  (26) 
assuming both time-averaged regressors and initial condition to be strictly exogenous. 
We ran preliminary POLS regressions, for the logarithm of ULC equation, in 
(12), augmented by the Chamberlain-Mundlak device, described in equation (26): 
 , 1 0it i t i i i i ity y y aφ θ υ−= + + + + +z β z γ  (27) 
where ( )logit ity ULC= , { },i i i⊃z R K  and 0iy  corresponds to the logULC value for the 
first year that a given firm is observed. We assume strict exogeneity, in terms of the 
composite error i ita υ+ . Even though this is a very strong assumption and 
( ), 1 0i t iE y a− ≠ , this approach produces persistence estimates lying between those from 
POLS and Sys-GMM, and elasticities estimates between FE and Sys-GMM ones. No 
simulations were made. Hence, discussions about the bias order remain unclear. 
                                                 
15 See Chamberlain (1982) and Mundlak (1978). 
16 See sub-section 5.2. 






7. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE RESEARCH 
In this study we have investigated the relationship between Portuguese firm-
level ULCs and the monetary and financial variables. In the case of an active monetary 
policy from the ECB, Portuguese authorities should aim at promoting demand policies, 
stimulating the GDP growth, driver of the Small firms’ ULCs. Consequently, we would 
expect a potential increase on aggregate competitiveness, if the reduction in Small 
firms’ ULCs is greater than in the other countries or exporting markets, as a result from 
a positive variation in several interest rates. 
Furthermore, micro policies should be encouraged and aimed to a specific sector 
or firms’ cluster, due to heterogeneous and/or quicker adjustments to monetary and 
financial shocks, like the Medium and Large firms, once their ULCs are expected to be 
driven by the Labor Market variables, typically known to be highly rigid. Hence, 
flexibilizing the Portuguese Labor Market may produce a desirable outcome for such 
firms, especially in terms of competitiveness. 
Contrasting with country-level literature, these effects do not seem to be driven 
by CAE 3-digit price deflators. However, this conclusion might not hold, if we had firm-
level price deflators. 
Finally we propose further investigation on Portuguese firm-level ULCs, 
introducing rigidity indicators in the estimated models, widely reflecting Portuguese 
Labor Market conditions, attenuating potential functional form misspecification. 
Also, it would be interesting to investigate the asymptotic properties from POLS 
augmented by the Chamberlain-Mundlak device, in linear dynamic panel data models. 
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APPENDIX A – TABLES AND FIGURES 




    Mean Std.Dev Min Max Observations 
 
Mean Std.Dev Min Max Observations 
logULC Overall -0.442 0.384 -6.451 0.424 N = 31112 
 




0.376 -5.171 0.361 n = 14925 
  
0.441 -7.889 0.328 n = 2210 
  Within   0.112 -4.181 1.435 Tbar = 2.085 
 
  0.0966 -1.219 1.003 Tbar = 2.371 
logWage Overall 9.589 0.409 5.517 14.77 N = 31112 
 




0.408 6.152 14.14 n = 14925 
  
0.473 6.609 12.74 n = 2210 
  Within   0.0948 6.568 12.49 Tbar = 2.085 
 
  0.0866 7.718 11.80 Tbar = 2.371 
logEmp Overall 3.021 0.594 0 5.872 N = 31112 
 




0.598 0 5.835 n = 14925 
  
0.705 0.347 8.645 n = 2210 
  Within   0.118 0.219 5.131 Tbar = 2.085 
 
  0.109 2.631 6.704 Tbar = 2.371 
logVA Overall 13.10 0.777 10.62 17.32 N = 31112 
 




0.780 10.88 17.25 n = 14925 
  
0.860 12.88 20.35 n = 2210 
  Within   0.133 11.46 14.73 Tbar = 2.085 
 
  0.122 13.89 15.76 Tbar = 2.371 
logDef Overall 0.0451 0.0375 -0.336 0.609 N = 31112 
 




0.0328 -0.274 0.609 n = 14925 
  
0.0509 -0.275 0.590 n = 2210 
  Within   0.0197 -0.366 0.243 Tbar = 2.085 
 
  0.0267 -0.372 0.272 Tbar = 2.371 
logACD Overall -2.411 0.849 -10.05 -0.000202 N = 31112 
 




0.814 -9.704 -0.00496 n = 14925 
  
0.685 -7.117 -0.0165 n = 2210 
  Within   0.414 -6.249 1.940 Tbar = 2.085 
 
  0.416 -5.477 0.444 Tbar = 2.371 
logBank Overall -2.996 0.998 -13.82 -0.00496 N = 31112 
 




0.955 -13.82 -0.00496 n = 14925 
  
0.886 -14.36 -0.500 n = 2210 
  Within   0.526 -9.696 2.374 Tbar = 2.085 
 
  0.544 -8.799 2.176 Tbar = 2.371 
logMLF Overall -3.301 0.383 -3.867 -3.028 N = 31112 
 




0.259 -3.867 -3.028 n = 14925 
  




0.330 -3.864 -2.888 Tbar = 2.085 
  
0.327 -3.855 -2.879 Tbar = 2.371 
 
  






Table A.2 – Descriptive Statistics for Large firms, IES sample (2006-2009) and Full sample (2003-2009), variables in levels 
Large 
 
Large - Full Sample 
    Mean Std.Dev Min Max Observations 
 
Mean Std.Dev Min Max Observations 
logULC Overall -0.613 0.808 -6.815 0.125 N = 501 
 




0.701 -6.544 0.0862 n = 201 
  
0.675 -6.076 0.0862 n = 201 
  Within   0.0947 -1.137 0.0403 Tbar = 2.493 
 
  0.132 -1.385 0.355 Tbar = 3.557 
logWage Overall 10.06 0.596 8.341 11.92 N = 501 
 




0.577 8.492 11.83 n = 201 
  
0.575 8.492 11.83 n = 201 
  Within   0.0665 9.699 10.64 Tbar = 2.493 
 
  0.108 9.436 11.28 Tbar = 3.557 
logEmp Overall 6.186 1.005 0 9.887 N = 501 
 




0.983 0 9.887 n = 201 
  
0.965 0.324 9.887 n = 201 
  Within   0.0770 5.601 6.631 Tbar = 2.493 
 
  0.125 5.585 7.791 Tbar = 3.557 
logVA Overall 16.90 0.944 15.02 20.33 N = 501 
 




0.925 15.04 20.32 n = 201 
  
0.924 15.04 20.32 n = 201 
  Within   0.107 16.18 17.36 Tbar = 2.493 
 
  0.153 16.14 17.50 Tbar = 3.557 
logDef Overall 0.0382 0.0468 -0.114 0.265 N = 501 
 




0.0400 -0.114 0.210 n = 201 
  
0.0466 -0.225 0.210 n = 201 
  Within   0.0298 -0.0709 0.143 Tbar = 2.493 
 
  0.0574 -0.270 0.268 Tbar = 3.557 
logACD Overall -2.445 0.906 -6.757 -0.0611 N = 501 
 




0.862 -5.457 -0.0611 n = 201 
  
0.832 -5.457 -0.0611 n = 201 
  Within   0.431 -4.452 0.410 Tbar = 2.493 
 
  0.510 -4.928 0.313 Tbar = 3.557 
logBank Overall -3.009 1.288 -12.53 -0.167 N = 501 
 




1.453 -12.30 -0.719 n = 201 
  
1.331 -12.30 -0.719 n = 201 
  Within   0.520 -6.335 0.316 Tbar = 2.493 
 
  0.607 -6.936 0.812 Tbar = 3.557 
logMLF Overall -3.290 0.349 -3.867 -3.028 N = 501 
 




0.217 -3.867 -3.028 n = 201 
  




0.314 -3.852 -2.877 Tbar = 2.493 
  
0.282 -3.908 -2.917 Tbar = 3.557 
 
Table A.3 – Number of Firms in sample, from 2006 to 2009, by Sector 
No. of Firms 
Industry Electricity & Water Supply Construction Trade Services 
Small 4716 112 3055 4017 3025 
Medium 1039 44 297 385 445 
Large 86 7 26 26 56 






Figure A.1 – Aggregate Interest Rates, from 2006 to 2009 
 
Notes: ACD corresponds to the Apparent Cost of Debt, i_SR+LR corresponds to the Bank’s interest rate 
for Short Run and Long Run loans and i_MLF corresponds to the Marginal Lending Facility. 
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Figure A.3 – Empirical Distribution of the Apparent Cost of Debt, from 2006 to 2009, 
by firm's size 
 
 
Figure A.4 – Empirical Distribution of the Bank's interest rate for Short Run and Long 
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APPENDIX B – VARIABLES DESCRIPTION 
The Unit Labor Costs and their decomposition (continuous variables): 
• logULC – logarithm of Unit Labor Cost, by firm; 
• logWage – logarithm of the Total Labor Compensation per Worker, by firm; 
• logEmp – logarithm of the Number of Employees, by firm; 
• logVA – logarithm of the Value Added, by firm; 
• logDef – logarithm of Price Deflator, by CAE, at 3 digit level. 
Financial variables (continuous variables): 
• logACD – logarithm of Apparent Cost of Debt, by firm; 
• logBank – logarithm of Bank’s interest rate for short run and long run loans, by 
_              firm; 
• logMLF – logarithm of Marginal Lending Facility reference rate, by firm. 
Controls (continuous variables), omitted from the outputs: 
• logTurn – logarithm of the Turnover, by firm; 
• logROE – logarithm of Return on Equity ratio, by firm; 
• m_exper – average workers’ experience years, by firm; 
• logEducIndex – logarithm of Workers’ education Index, a weighted average of 
_____________number of workers per years of schooling, by firm; 
• Ext (dummy variable) – 1 if firm is Active Abroad (imports and/or exports 
___________________    goods and/or services), 0 if otherwise; 
• perc_for – Percentage of Foreign Capital participation, by firm. 






APPENDIX C – ESTIMATION RESULTS 
Table C.1 – Static Model: Fixed Effects versus Between Effects 
  logWage logEmp logVA logDef logULC 




(1) logACD 0.00161 0.0136*** -0.00938*** 0.0135*** 0.0112*** 0.0191*** 0.000230 -0.00337*** -0.0187*** 0.00462 
 
(0.00215) (0.00329) (0.00261) (0.00498) (0.00246) (0.00436) (0.000299) (0.000298) (0.00236) (0.00363) 
(2) logBank 0.000853 -0.00436* -0.00431*** -0.00153 0.00674*** -0.000535 0.000227 -0.00119*** -0.00997*** -0.00654** 





 (1) logACD 0.00131 0.0253*** -0.00732 0.0468** 0.00538 0.0362** 0.00179 -0.00571** -0.00960** 0.0302* 
 
(0.00401) (0.00928) (0.00516) (0.0217) (0.00461) (0.0164) (0.00114) (0.00277) (0.00396) (0.0164) 
(2) logBank 0.00181 0.0242*** -0.00587* -0.0180 -0.00249 0.0219* 0.000496 -0.00384** -0.00108 -0.0196* 




(1) logACD 0.0123 0.00844 -0.0216*** 0.00684 0.00836 -0.0130 -0.00195 0.000513 -0.0196* 0.0288 
 
(0.00752) (0.0233) (0.00824) (0.0520) (0.00830) (0.0345) (0.00320) (0.00265) (0.0103) (0.0326) 
(2) logBank 0.0151* -0.00224 -0.0194** -0.0336 0.00995 -0.00406 -0.000411 0.000665 -0.0147 -0.0312 




   









(1) logACD -0.000966 -0.00326 -0.0104 0.0355 -0.00183 -0.00627 -0.00599* 0.00357 -0.0156 0.0421 
 
(0.00707) (0.0269) (0.00911) (0.0579) (0.00804) (0.0410) (0.00335) (0.00374) (0.0102) (0.0346) 
(2) logBank 0.00717 -0.00314 -0.0204** -0.0387 -0.00389 -0.00413 -0.000814 0.000558 -0.0102 -0.0371 
 
(0.00626) (0.0140) (0.0101) (0.0426) (0.00971) (0.0242) (0.00288) (0.00217) (0.00819) (0.0280) 
 
Notes: this table reports estimation results for the logarithm of ULC equation, in (9), and for the system of log-decomposed ULC, in (10), between 2006 and 2009, both based on 
equation-by-equation Fixed (FE) and Between effects (BE) estimations. Significance levels: *10%, **5%, ***1%. Standard errors in parentheses are clustered by firms, White cluster, 
for FE, cluster bootstrap, based on one hundred replications, for BE. All control variables, sectoral and time dummies were included; however External Position and sectoral dummies 
were not identified in FE; time dummies were not identified in BE. Coefficients reported in bold refer to the highest statistically significant contributor to the overall effect. (1) logACD 
refer to the model with the logarithm of Apparent Cost of Debt and (2) logBank refer to the model with the logarithm of Bank’s interest rate for Short Run and Long Run loans. The 
“Large [Full Sample]” row, refer to the 2003-2009 period.  






Table C.1.1 – Hausman specification tests, based on the classical (non-robust) and Wooldridge’s (robust) versions 
  
Small Medium Large Large - Full Sample 
    Non-Robust  Robust  Non-Robust  Robust  Non-Robust  Robust  Non-Robust  Robust  
logWage (1) logACD 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,032 0,815 0,004 0,374 
(2) logBank 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,038 0,633 0,004 0,304 
logEmp (1) logACD 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,001 0,134 0,371 0,271 0,618 
(2) logBank 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,004 0,205 0,468 0,300 0,708 
logVA (1) logACD 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,131 0,154 0,017 0,134 
(2) logBank 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,146 0,205 0,017 0,140 
logDef (1) logACD 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,007 0,000 0,005 0,000 0,004 
(2) logBank 0,000 0,000 0,001 0,011 0,000 0,013 0,001 0,008 
logULC (1) logACD 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,135 0,108 0,011 0,393 
(2) logBank 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,001 0,222 0,348 0,013 0,552 
 
Notes: This table reports the estimated p-values for the Hausman tests, based on the classical (non-robust) version and on Wooldridge (2002) version, for the logarithm of ULC equation, 
in (9), and for the system of log-decomposed ULC, in (10), between 2006 and 2009, based on Random effects (RE) estimations. On Wooldridge’s version, RE estimations with White 
cluster robust standard errors. All control variables, sectoral and time dummies were included and identified. P-values reported in bold refer to the non-rejection of the null. (1) logACD 
refer to the model with the logarithm of Apparent Cost of Debt and (2) logBank refer to the model with the logarithm of Bank’s interest rate for Short Run and Long Run loans. The 
“Large [Full Sample]” column, refer to the 2003-2009 period. 
  






Table C.2 – Cross-Sectional analysis: Seemingly Unrelated Regression (decomposed ULC) and Ordinary Least Squares (ULC equation) 
Table C.2.1 – For Small and Medium firms 
  
Small Medium 








2006 -0.00725 0.0351 0.0114 #N/A 0.0164 -0.00826 0.0329 0.0153 #N/A 0.00934 
  (0.0145) (0.0293) (0.0242) #N/A (0.0199) (0.0176) (0.0362) (0.0347) #N/A (0.0206) 
2007 0.0153*** 0.0195*** 0.0231*** -0.000861*** 0.0108*** 0.0164 0.0254 0.0139 -0.00211* 0.0257 
  (0.00464) (0.00551) (0.00573) (0.000205) (0.00368) (0.0122) (0.0233) (0.0159) (0.00109) (0.0169) 
2008 0.0172*** 0.00775 0.0141** -0.00176*** 0.00913** 0.0344*** 0.0303 0.0508** -0.00330 0.0106 
  (0.00471) (0.00598) (0.00581) (0.000290) (0.00424) (0.0125) (0.0254) (0.0197) (0.00210) (0.0234) 
2009 0.0111*** 4.18e-05 0.0168*** -0.00183*** -0.00752* 0.0242** 0.0461* 0.0466*** -0.00182 0.0218 
  (0.00405) (0.00659) (0.00561) (0.000390) (0.00396) (0.00950) (0.0239) (0.0134) (0.00295) (0.0185) 
Sig. of Difference in effects 







2006 -0.0153 -0.00646 0.0158 #N/A -0.0376** 0.0179 -0.00331 0.0666** #N/A -0.0520*** 
  (0.0149) (0.0375) (0.0285) #N/A (0.0188) (0.0171) (0.0319) (0.0332) #N/A (0.0185) 
2007 -0.00303 0.00526 0.00351 0.000127 -0.00116 0.0176* -0.000935 0.0202* -0.00108 -0.00461 
  (0.00326) (0.00474) (0.00437) (0.000150) (0.00372) (0.00991) (0.0175) (0.0120) (0.00128) (0.0127) 
2008 0.000563 -0.00465 -0.000374 0.000112 -0.00360 0.0180** -0.0179 0.0139 0.000282 -0.0135 
  (0.00327) (0.00495) (0.00434) (0.000292) (0.00241) (0.00918) (0.0206) (0.0144) (0.00144) (0.0105) 
2009 -0.00628** -0.0108* -0.00464 0.000111 -0.0123*** 0.0142* -0.00877 0.0188* -0.00133 -0.0147 
  (0.00308) (0.00566) (0.00501) (0.000296) (0.00338) (0.00749) (0.0160) (0.0107) (0.00189) (0.0117) 
Sig. of Difference in effects 
among years Test 0.295 0.108 0.548 0.998 0.00972 0.985 0.866 0.506 0.643 0.125 
 
Notes: this table reports estimation results for the logarithm of ULC equation, in (15), and for the system of log-decomposed ULC, in (16), between 2006 and 2009. The logarithm of 
ULC equation is estimated by OLS and the system of log-decomposed ULC is estimated by SUR. Significance levels: *10%, **5%, ***1%. Standard errors in parentheses are bootstrap 
clustered by firms, based on one hundred replications, in both OLS and SUR. All control variables and sectoral dummies were included and identified. Coefficients reported in bold refer 
to the highest statistically significant contributor to the overall effect, in each year. (1) logACD refer to the model with the logarithm of Apparent Cost of Debt and (2) logBank refer to 
the model with the logarithm of Bank’s interest rate for Short Run and Long Run loans. It is also reported the estimated p-values for the coefficient equality test among different years, 
for both logarithm of ULC equation and for each equation of the log-decomposed system; p-values reported in bold refer to the non-rejection of the null. 






Table C.2.2 – For Large firms 
  
Large 








2003 -0.0149 -0.00559 -0.0793 -0.00202 0.0568 
 
(0.0868) (0.159) (0.0977) (0.0107) (0.0900) 
2004 -0.0268 -0.0610 -0.122* -0.00552 0.0291 
 
(0.0394) (0.122) (0.0689) (0.00974) (0.0600) 
2005 -0.0920* 0.162 0.0292 0.00212 0.0431 
 
(0.0532) (0.130) (0.0703) (0.00487) (0.0702) 
2006 -0.0655 0.0178 -0.00488 #N/A -0.0429 
 
(0.0528) (0.130) (0.0581) #N/A (0.0909) 
2007 -0.0240 0.0322 0.00729 -0.00126 -0.000387 
 
(0.0307) (0.0628) (0.0354) (0.00314) (0.0358) 
2008 0.0349 -0.0565 -0.0220 0.00255 0.00293 
 
(0.0270) (0.0600) (0.0437) (0.00370) (0.0352) 
2009 0.0368 -0.0825 -0.0352 0.00514 -0.00528 
 
(0.0280) (0.0711) (0.0425) (0.00520) (0.0407) 
Sig. of Difference in effects among 
years Test 0.0765 0.511 0.832 0.397 0.968 
Sig. of Difference in effects among 







2003 -0.0462 -0.0640 -0.105 0.00139 -0.00391 
 
(0.0589) (0.112) (0.0762) (0.0103) (0.0597) 
2004 -0.0399 -0.0373 -0.139** -0.0111 0.0505 
 
(0.0399) (0.100) (0.0612) (0.00869) (0.0580) 
2005 -0.0340 -0.00504 0.0385 0.00776 -0.0698 
 
(0.0435) (0.121) (0.0977) (0.00699) (0.0618) 
2006 -0.0217 -0.0955 0.00824 #N/A -0.125 
 
(0.0395) (0.146) (0.104) #N/A (0.0847) 
2007 0.00188 -0.0403 0.00726 0.000725 -0.0449 
 
(0.0158) (0.0436) (0.0249) (0.00122) (0.0290) 
2008 0.00945 -0.0731 -0.0403 0.00230 -0.0210 
 
(0.0184) (0.0498) (0.0381) (0.00260) (0.0333) 
2009 0.0207 -0.0593 -0.0134 0.00497 -0.0203 
 
(0.0196) (0.0545) (0.0271) (0.00401) (0.0354) 
Sig. of Difference in effects among 
years Test 0.711 0.957 0.586 0.544 0.505 
Sig. of Difference in effects among 
years Test [Full Sample] 0.764 0.979 0.22 0.416 0.65 
Notes: see notes for table C.2.1 
  






Table C.3 – Dynamic Model for the log-decomposed ULC: Pooled Ordinary Least Squares and Fixed effects 
Table C.3.1 – Estimations with the logarithm of Apparent Cost of Debt 
  
logWage logEmp logVA logDef 




L.logULC 0.0635*** 0.0219* 0.726*** 0.0658*** -0.0472*** 0.147*** 0.00252*** 0.00730*** 
 
(0.0102) (0.0122) (0.0156) (0.0147) (0.0158) (0.0148) (0.000719) (0.00176) 
logACD 0.0119*** 0.000681 -0.00865** -0.00938*** 0.0182*** 0.0104*** -0.000818*** 0.000268 
 
(0.00280) (0.00215) (0.00389) (0.00265) (0.00379) (0.00250) (0.000231) (0.000307) 
L.logACD 0.00338 -0.00643*** 0.0125*** -0.00109 0.00216 -0.00752*** -0.00109*** 0.000289 
 
(0.00264) (0.00197) (0.00391) (0.00241) (0.00372) (0.00255) (0.000237) (0.000325) 






L.logULC -0.0742*** 0.00983 0.919*** 0.125* -0.0969** 0.0675* 0.0133*** 0.0230*** 
 
(0.0263) (0.0234) (0.0469) (0.0705) (0.0434) (0.0373) (0.00356) (0.00691) 
logACD 0.0217*** 0.000617 0.00579 -0.00727 0.0394*** 0.00521 -0.00117 0.00205* 
 
(0.00727) (0.00402) (0.0129) (0.00534) (0.0116) (0.00476) (0.00135) (0.00117) 
L.logACD 0.00150 -0.00720** 0.0145 0.00403 -0.00518 -0.00190 -0.00106 0.00305*** 
 
(0.00702) (0.00339) (0.0134) (0.00467) (0.0121) (0.00452) (0.000904) (0.00116) 




L.logULC -0.0922*** -0.0632** 1.136*** 0.0355 0.0579 0.0436 0.00324 0.0134 
 
(0.0352) (0.0298) (0.0703) (0.0278) (0.0592) (0.0521) (0.00215) (0.0192) 
logACD 0.00897 0.0113 -0.0177 -0.0221** 0.00164 0.00672 0.00240 -0.00188 
 
(0.0162) (0.00738) (0.0338) (0.00855) (0.0284) (0.00790) (0.00328) (0.00303) 
L.logACD -0.00573 -0.00669 0.00862 0.00230 -0.00998 0.000466 5.06e-05 0.00302 
 
(0.0194) (0.00828) (0.0394) (0.00952) (0.0289) (0.0107) (0.00383) (0.00393) 




   
   
   
   
   
   
   









L.logULC -0.106*** 0.115** 1.149*** 0.154*** 0.0642 -0.0520 0.00512* 0.0434* 
 
(0.0374) (0.0520) (0.0856) (0.0528) (0.0666) (0.0424) (0.00300) (0.0238) 
logACD -0.00236 0.00183 0.00851 -0.0121 0.0116 -0.00284 -0.000705 -0.00611* 
 
(0.0154) (0.00636) (0.0287) (0.00908) (0.0251) (0.00790) (0.00330) (0.00315) 
L.logACD -0.00544 -0.00563 -0.0137 0.00636 -0.0311 -0.00545 0.00121 0.00230 
 
(0.0173) (0.00908) (0.0317) (0.00917) (0.0225) (0.0120) (0.00313) (0.00368) 
Long Run Multiplier test p-value 0.727 0.763 0.895 0.623 0.522 0.548 0.860 0.461 
Notes: see last page. 






Table C.3.2 – Estimations with the logarithm of Bank’s interest rate for Short Run and Long Run loans 
  
logWage logEmp logVA logDef 




L.logULC 0.0648*** 0.0228* 0.727*** 0.0658*** -0.0455*** 0.148*** 0.00236*** 0.00727*** 
 
(0.0101) (0.0122) (0.0156) (0.0146) (0.0158) (0.0148) (0.000719) (0.00176) 
logBank -0.000940 0.000630 -0.00371 -0.00404** 0.00360 0.00680*** 0.000166 0.000256 
 
(0.00216) (0.00150) (0.00313) (0.00172) (0.00302) (0.00183) (0.000162) (0.000234) 
L.logBank -0.00294 -0.00257* 0.00209 -0.00122 -0.00625** -0.00362** -7.72e-05 0.000210 
 
(0.00202) (0.00143) (0.00302) (0.00172) (0.00294) (0.00175) (0.000178) (0.000247) 






L.logULC -0.0711*** 0.0132 0.921*** 0.122* -0.0928** 0.0680* 0.0131*** 0.0215*** 
 
(0.0264) (0.0234) (0.0467) (0.0695) (0.0434) (0.0368) (0.00357) (0.00701) 
logBank 0.0140** 0.00133 -0.00166 -0.00595 0.0170** -0.00285 -8.06e-05 0.000662 
 
(0.00588) (0.00258) (0.00936) (0.00364) (0.00833) (0.00334) (0.000883) (0.000853) 
L.logBank 0.00424 -0.00228 0.00900 5.26e-05 0.00664 -0.00181 -0.000272 0.000771 
 
(0.00454) (0.00219) (0.00909) (0.00261) (0.00825) (0.00282) (0.000766) (0.000813) 




L.logULC -0.0916** -0.0632** 1.135*** 0.0384 0.0596 0.0415 0.00364 0.0141 
 
(0.0356) (0.0303) (0.0707) (0.0281) (0.0595) (0.0521) (0.00232) (0.0191) 
logBank 0.00464 0.0140* -0.0147 -0.0199** -0.00438 0.00805 0.00159 -0.000596 
 
(0.0110) (0.00844) (0.0245) (0.00770) (0.0225) (0.00676) (0.00215) (0.00319) 
L.logBank -0.00102 -0.00337 0.00831 0.00865 0.00849 -0.00465 0.000798 0.00349 
 
(0.0139) (0.00731) (0.0330) (0.00895) (0.0305) (0.00785) (0.00225) (0.00308) 




   
   
   
   
   
   
   









L.logULC -0.106*** 0.117** 1.147*** 0.150*** 0.0635 -0.0538 0.00547* 0.0446* 
 
(0.0377) (0.0518) (0.0859) (0.0535) (0.0667) (0.0425) (0.00308) (0.0240) 
logBank -0.00230 0.00903 -0.00306 -0.0207** -0.00107 -0.00308 0.000525 -0.000951 
 
(0.0102) (0.00623) (0.0233) (0.00986) (0.0214) (0.00974) (0.00246) (0.00271) 
L.logBank 0.00262 -0.00378 -0.00857 -0.000619 -0.00493 -0.0102 0.00138 0.00373 
 
(0.0128) (0.00558) (0.0289) (0.00724) (0.0253) (0.00808) (0.00210) (0.00272) 
Long Run Multiplier test p-value 0.982 0.529 0.696 0.070 0.803 0.269 0.413 0.479 
Notes: see last page. 






Table C.3.3 – Estimations with the logarithm of Marginal Lending Facility 
  
logWage logEmp logVA logDef 




L.logULC 0.0646*** 0.0228* 0.726*** 0.0668*** -0.0460*** 0.149*** 0.00250*** 0.00788*** 
 
(0.0101) (0.0122) (0.0156) (0.0146) (0.0158) (0.0148) (0.000717) (0.00178) 
logMLF -0.00402 0.00399 -0.00115 -0.0596*** -0.0207*** -0.0379*** -0.0155*** -0.0163*** 
 
(0.00339) (0.00291) (0.00490) (0.00433) (0.00465) (0.00347) (0.000404) (0.000430) 
L.logMLF 0.0528*** 0.0587*** -0.0826*** 0.185*** 0.0708*** 0.225*** 0.103*** 0.103*** 
 
(0.0112) (0.00924) (0.0161) (0.0136) (0.0161) (0.0140) (0.000985) (0.00143) 






L.logULC -0.0724*** 0.0149 0.921*** 0.122* -0.0947** 0.0687* 0.0132*** 0.0215*** 
 
(0.0266) (0.0233) (0.0466) (0.0685) (0.0433) (0.0365) (0.00356) (0.00713) 
logMLF 0.0188** -0.00676 -0.0192 -0.0355*** -0.0353*** -0.0389*** -0.00476*** -0.00296* 
 
(0.00911) (0.00799) (0.0132) (0.00860) (0.0119) (0.00609) (0.00161) (0.00157) 
L.logMLF 0.0484** 0.0541*** -0.182*** 0.0915*** 0.0182 0.125*** 0.108*** 0.0965*** 
 
(0.0245) (0.0210) (0.0376) (0.0228) (0.0338) (0.0193) (0.00307) (0.00447) 




L.logULC -0.0920*** -0.0617** 1.135*** 0.0348 0.0587 0.0468 0.00324 0.0134 
 
(0.0351) (0.0300) (0.0704) (0.0284) (0.0589) (0.0541) (0.00217) (0.0194) 
logMLF 0.0222 0.00378 -0.0155 -0.0239 -0.0153 -0.00530 -0.00814 -0.00818 
 
(0.0263) (0.0154) (0.0557) (0.0183) (0.0517) (0.0169) (0.00519) (0.00573) 
L.logMLF -0.0146 0.0245 0.0338 0.0708 0.102 0.0477 0.117*** 0.104*** 
 
(0.0495) (0.0589) (0.0958) (0.0550) (0.0788) (0.0345) (0.00834) (0.0126) 




   
   
   
   
   
   
   









L.logULC -0.104*** 0.131*** 1.128*** 0.156*** 0.0624 -0.0300 0.0180*** 0.0750** 
 
(0.0365) (0.0454) (0.0887) (0.0508) (0.0656) (0.0405) (0.00661) (0.0339) 
logMLF 0.0153 -0.0105 -0.0779 -0.0208 -0.0161 -0.0115 0.0289*** 0.0150** 
 
(0.0235) (0.0128) (0.0481) (0.0154) (0.0425) (0.0169) (0.00539) (0.00595) 
L.logMLF 0.0124 0.0363 -0.0571 0.0591** 0.102 0.0978*** 0.160*** 0.0586*** 
 
(0.0544) (0.0226) (0.0955) (0.0293) (0.0815) (0.0279) (0.0112) (0.0141) 
Long Run Multiplier test p-value 0.666 0.358 0.253 0.177 0.412 0.008 0.000 0.000 
Notes: see last page. 






Table C.4 – Dynamic Model for the ULC equation: POLS, FE and Two-step System GMM 
Table C.4.1 – Estimations with the logarithm of Apparent Cost of Debt and with the logarithm of Bank’s interest rate 
 
Small Medium Large Large - Full Sample 
  POLS FE Sys-GMM POLS FE Sys-GMM POLS FE Sys-GMM POLS FE Sys-GMM 
L.logULC 0.840*** -0.0523*** 0.617*** 0.955*** 0.0902* 0.810*** 0.989*** -0.0579 0.907*** 0.984*** 0.364*** 0.936*** 
 
(0.00790) (0.0192) (0.0741) (0.0178) (0.0484) (0.113) (0.0144) (0.0627) (0.116) (0.0146) (0.0711) (0.0768) 
logACD -0.0157*** -0.0189*** -0.0185*** -0.0130* -0.00981** 0.00552 -0.00794 -0.0194* -0.0381 -0.00620 -0.0135 -0.0182 
 
(0.00160) (0.00246) (0.00711) (0.00768) (0.00403) (0.0202) (0.00994) (0.0103) (0.0343) (0.00820) (0.00883) (0.0199) 
L.logACD 0.0126*** 0.000280 0.0130*** 0.0202 0.00177 0.0156 0.0129 -0.00184 -0.0428 0.0131* 0.00848 -0.00280 
 
(0.00158) (0.00235) (0.00494) (0.0128) (0.00450) (0.0121) (0.00903) (0.0156) (0.0365) (0.00777) (0.0107) (0.0229) 
1-Step Multiplier     0,002     0,02     -0,077     -0,02 
1SM Test p-value     0,838     0,419     0,21     0,59 
Long Run Multiplier     -0,014     0,111     -0,87     -0,328 
LRM Test p-value     0,577     0,446     0,559     0,692 
No. of Instruments     33     31     25     43 
Hansen p-value     0,822     0,444     0,584     0,917 
L.logULC 0.839*** -0.0523*** 0.729*** 0.956*** 0.0890* 0.805*** 0.988*** -0.0522 0.958*** 0.983*** 0.365*** 0.850*** 
 
(0.00790) (0.0191) (0.103) (0.0182) (0.0478) (0.115) (0.0149) (0.0624) (0.157) (0.0148) (0.0709) (0.0830) 
logBank -0.00808*** -0.00995*** -0.00766* -0.00475 -0.00111 0.00393 -0.00408 -0.0146 -0.0171 -0.00376 -0.00955 0.00187 
 
(0.00114) (0.00169) (0.00391) (0.00420) (0.00296) (0.00954) (0.00779) (0.00968) (0.0358) (0.00649) (0.00773) (0.0236) 
L.logBank 0.00533*** 4.33e-05 0.00761** 0.00632 0.000353 0.00268 -0.000406 0.0134 0.00266 0.000349 0.00953 0.00612 
 
(0.00113) (0.00165) (0.00349) (0.00703) (0.00280) (0.00914) (0.00768) (0.0103) (0.0456) (0.00644) (0.00754) (0.0296) 
1-Step Multiplier     0,002     0,006     -0,014     0,008 
1SM Test p-value     0,708     0,697     0,811     0,867 
Long Run Multiplier     -0,0002     0,034     -0,344     0,053 
LRM Test p-value     0,994     0,703     0,875     0,868 
No. of Instruments     33     31     25     43 
Hansen p-value     0,942     0,315     0,334     0,826 
 
Notes: see last page.






Table C.4.2. – Estimations with the logarithm of Marginal Lending Facility 
 
Small Medium Large Large - Full Sample 
  POLS FE Sys-GMM POLS FE Sys-GMM POLS FE Sys-GMM POLS FE Sys-GMM 
L.logULC 0.839*** -0.0517*** 0.681*** 0.956*** 0.0896* 0.810*** 0.988*** -0.0603 0.885*** 0.980*** 0.392*** 0.888*** 
 
(0.00787) (0.0191) (0.126) (0.0182) (0.0472) (0.102) (0.0150) (0.0621) (0.112) (0.0156) (0.0636) (0.0565) 
logMLF 4.13e-06 -0.0340*** -0.0304*** 0.0301*** -0.00631 -0.00670 0.0139 -0.0230 -0.0140 -0.0175 -0.00471 -0.00142 
 
(0.00313) (0.00310) (0.00942) (0.00969) (0.00629) (0.0274) (0.0187) (0.0177) (0.0643) (0.0169) (0.0172) (0.0240) 
L.logMLF 0.00235 0.122*** 0.0272 -0.0437*** 0.117*** 0.0801 0.0347 0.152*** -0.0604 0.0137 0.0562** -0.0199 
 
(0.00877) (0.0108) (0.0381) (0.0164) (0.0162) (0.0659) (0.0534) (0.0482) (0.135) (0.0311) (0.0281) (0.0602) 
1-Step Multiplier     0,007     0,075     -0,073     -0,021 
1SM Test p-value     0,87     0,182     0,515     0,758 
Long Run Multiplier     -0,01     0,386     -0,647     -0,190 
LRM Test p-value     0,994     0,703     0,875     0,868 
No. of Instruments     31     29     23     38 
Hansen p-value     0,507     0,595     0,564     0,898 
Notes: see last page. 






Notes for Tables C.3.1 to C.3.3: 
Notes: this table reports estimation results for the system of log-decomposed ULC, in (13), between 2006 and 2009, 
both based on equation-by-equation POLS and FE estimations. Significance levels: *10%, **5%, ***1%. Standard 
errors in parentheses are clustered by firms. All control variables, sectoral and time dummies were included; however 
External Position and sectoral dummies were not identified in FE. Coefficients reported in bold refer to the highest 
statistically significant contributor to the overall effect. The “Large [Full Sample]” row, refer to the 2003-2009 
period. It is also reported the estimated p-values for the Long run multiplier tests, for each equation of the log-
decomposed system (see section 5.4); p-values reported in bold refer to the highest statistically significant contributor 
to the Long run overall effect. 
Notes for Tables C.4.1 to C.4.2: 
Notes: this table reports estimation results for the logarithm of ULC equation, in (12), between 2006 and 2009, based 
on POLS, FE and Two-step System GMM estimations. Significance levels: *10%, **5%, ***1%. Standard errors in 
parentheses are clustered by firms, for POLS and FE estimations, while, for System GMM estimations, standard 
errors in parentheses are corrected, based on Windmeijer (2005). All control variables, sectoral and time dummies 
were included; however External Position and sectoral dummies were not identified in FE. The “Large [Full 
Sample]” column, refer to the 2003-2009 period. It is also reported both values and estimated p-values, based on delta 
method approximation (non-linear Wald tests), for the One-step ahead and Long run multipliers (see section 5.4). 
Instrumentation strategy: 
Lagged logarithm of ULC as endogenous, monetary and financial variables as predetermined and collapsed, and 
controls as severely endogenous and collapsed, for Small and Medium firms’ estimations, while, for Large firms’ 
estimations, controls were considered endogenous and also collapsed. The entire set of lags were considered to 
instrument the endogenous covariates, for Small firms’ estimations; two lags, for Medium firms’ estimations, and one 
lag only, for Large firms’ estimations. 
